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By- KUMUD LATA DAS

The article critiques the possibilities and the limits of transformation by taking key cases from Kesavananda Bharati to Puttaswamy and Navtej Singh Johar and situating them against contemporary crises, including mass surveillance, internet shutdowns, custodial violence, caste and gender hierarchies, and electoral opacity. In the context of India’s experienced inequalities, comparative lessons from South Africa, Colombia, and Europe are examined. In conclusion, the article suggests a reevaluated framework of transformative constitutionalism for the twenty-first century, which is founded on democratic dialogue, socio-legal sensitivity, and structured proportionality. The doctrine of recusal occupies a vital place in the administration of justice by safeguarding public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary. Rooted in the fundamental principle of natural justice that no person should be a judge in their own cause (nemo judex in causa sua), the law of recusal seeks to eliminate both actual bias and the reasonable apprehension of bias. This article examines the conceptual foundations, jurisprudential evolution, and practical application of recusal through a critical analysis of leading Indian and English judicial precedents, including Dimes v Grand Junction Canal, Ranjit Thakur v Union of India, Manak Lal v Dr Prem Chand Singhvi, and Ashok Kumar Yadav v State of Haryana. It argues that recusal is primarily litigantcentric and aimed at preserving the appearance of fairness rather than questioning judicial integrity. The article further explores the doctrine of necessity, the discretionary nature of recusal, and its significance in maintaining judicial legitimacy, institutional credibility, and the rule of law in a constitutional democracy.

Keywords: Judicial Recusal, Natural Justice, Judicial Impartiality, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, Judicial Ethics and Accountability